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Several countries had an increase in female labor participation during 
the  twentieth  century.  Even  so,  few  of  them  can  be  proud  of  the 
conditions  these  women  faced  in  it.  This  paper  analyzes  the 
occupational distribution by gender from 1978 to 2007 in Brazil. It 
shows  that  women  are  entering  traditional  male  occupations  to  a 
certain extent, but they retain traditionally female occupations almost 
at the same level of occupation as they did 30 years ago. Also, we 
provide  a  regression  analysis  with  an  Oaxaca  decomposition  that 




Muitos países apresentaram aumento nos índices de participação das 
mulheres no mercado de trabalho no século vinte. Entretanto, poucos 
deles podem se orgulhar das condições de trabalho destas mulheres no 
mesmo.  Este  artigo  estuda  a  distribuição  ocupacional  de  ambos  os 
gêneros  de  1978  a  2007  no  Brasil.  Ele  mostra  que  as  mulheres 
entraram  em  algumas  ocupações  tradicionalmente  masculinas,  mas 
retêm alta participação nas ocupações femininas da mesma forma que 
há 30 anos atrás. Adicionalmente, a análise econométrica através da 
decomposição  de  Oaxaca  mostra  que  a  diferença  salarial  entre  os 
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Virtually all countries showed an increase in female labor participation during the 
twentieth century. Even so, few of them can be proud of the conditions these women faced in 
dealing  with  family  responsibilities  and  the  labor  market.  On  the  one  hand,  labor 
specialization within families continues to be biased by gender even when women engage in 
labor market activities. Women are engaged in the labor market, but they have to be available 
to  comply  with  their  family  responsibilities  of  housework,  childcare  and  other  activities 
dependent  on  them  (Hersch  &  Stratton,  1994;  Álvarez  &  Miles,  2006;  Lundberg,  2008; 
Madalozzo, Martins, & Shiratori, 2008; Gupta & Ash, 2008). On the other hand, women 
continue to receive lower wages than men, even when controlling for personal characteristics 
and job attributes (Blau & Kahn, 1997; Bertrand & Hallock, 2001; Albrecht, Björklund, & 
Vroman, 2003; Bayard, Hellerstein, & Neumark, 2003; Bucheli & Sanroman, 2005; Galarza, 
Medina, & Díaz, 2006; Madalozzo & Martins, 2007; Olivetti & Petrolongo, 2008). There is 
no consensus among specialists whether the former causes the latter or vice versa. However, 
the  majority  of  studies  came  to  the  same  result  that  some  intrinsic  gender  features  have 
significant influence on these outcomes of lower wage and second shift.  
One  possibility  is  that  career  interruptions  that  women  experience  during  their 
productive life
1 made them less productive for the labor market and, therefore, available to 
work for lower wage rates (Deloach & Hoffman, 2002; Hersch and Stratton, 2002; Moe, 
2003; Blau, Ferber,& Winkler, 2006; Bryan & Sanz, 2007).  Another option is that women’s 
wages  are lower because they  account for benefits that are  available only to  women,  for 
example, maternity leave (Waldfogel, 1998; Edwards, 2006; Bergmann, 2008). As a final 
point, another possibility is that women choose to work in occupations and activities that pay 
lower remuneration than those chosen by men (Easterlin, 1995; Macpherson & Hirsch, 1995; 
Miller, 2009). Either one of these possibilities may impact – or be impacted by – the gender 
division of work by making it less costly to the household for women to spend more hours at 
home instead of men; if both spouses are equally productive to the market, but the husband 
receives higher remuneration for his work than his wife, he has a comparative advantage in 
dedicating more time and effort to the market than her (Ferber, 2003). 
Our focus in this study is to analyze female labor participation in Brazil since the 
1970s. Brazil is a highly unequal country in several aspects. It has one of the worst Gini 
indexes in the world, 0.567, being the 10th worst income distribution of the world in 2007. 
                                                 
1 Labor intermittency caused by marriage, childbirth or other family need that she helped to solve. Concerning gender differences, Brazil ranked 74th – of 127 countries – in the 2007 World 
Economic Forum’s Gender Gap index, with a score of 0.664
2.  
Female labor participation in Brazil increased substantially during the second half of 
the twentieth century, as can be seen in Figure 1. In 1950, roughly 14 percent of females 
participated in the labor market. By 1980, this number had almost doubled to 27 percent. The 
1980s was the decade that witnessed the biggest inclusion of women in the labor market; and, 
by 1992, 47 percent of women were engaged in some economic activity or were seeking 
work. Since them, female inclusion in the labor market has slowly continued to grow. In 
2007,  52.4  percent  of  women  were  economically  active.  Nevertheless,  women’s  working 
conditions in the labor market or within their households remained inequitable.  
Other studies have analyzed labor market conditions for women in Brazil. Bruschini 
(1989,  1998)  reports  the  trends  for  the  female  labor  market  regarding  insertion  and 
intermittency. The present research continues these analyses into the new century. In addition, 
we use econometric resources to evaluate both female entries into industry and occupations as 
well as the comparison of female and male wages, given their characteristics. Giuberti and 
Menezes-Filho (2005) used the same methodology to compare earning differentials between 
men  and  women  for  Brazil  and  the  United  States;  however,  their  approach  assumed  the 
percentage of the earning gap was caused by individual characteristics and the percentage 
explained by discrimination. Complementing their work, we increased the period analyzed 
and emphasized the occupation choice on the wages’ profile. Our analyses target the average 
difference in labor market earnings for men and women for the period 1978 to 2007. 
This paper is organized as follows: in the next section we describe Brazilian labor 
characteristics,  focusing  on  activities  and  gender  differentials.  Section  3  explains  the 
empirical  model  used  to  analyze  the  gender  gap  in  remuneration  and  the  impact  of 
occupational differentials on it. The results are presented in Section 4 and Section 5 offers 
conclusions. 
 
2. Brazilian labor market: are there gender differences? 
  In this section we describe Brazilian labor markets and highlight the differences and 
similarities between genders with regard to it. Before that it is necessary to explain some 
peculiarities of the  Brazilian labor market. First, it is significantly regulated. Since the 1930s, 
                                                 
2 Where one represents complete equal treatment between genders and zero total inequality. Gender gap index 
considers four dimensions: economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, 
and political empowerment. with the implementation of the first laws concerning employment in Brazil, there have been 
an  increased  number  of  restrictions  and  fees  employers  must  pay  to  be  able  to  hire 
individuals.  The  constitution  of  1988  aggravated  this  problem.  Second,  women  overcame 
specific rights to maternity leave. Until 1988, all female workers had the right to fully paid 
maternity leave of 90 days. The new constitution increased this right to 120 days. In 2007, a 
new  federal  legislation  was  passed  to  make  possible  the  World  Health  Organization’s 
recommendation to breastfeed babies for 6 months. By this law, female workers may opt to 
take  6  months  of  maternity  leave,  also  fully  paid  by  the  employer
3.  These  excessive 
regulations on the labor market are the concern of many researchers who question its validity 
to guarantee workers’ rights or move them to informal jobs, where they will have no rights at 
all. 
 All  our  analysis  used  the  microdata  from  PNAD,  National  Research  of  Sampled 
Households (Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra por Domicílios). PNAD is an annual research 
study conducted by the Brazilian Bureau of Statistics, IBGE. It takes a representative sample 
of Brazilian households and studies, among other aspects of the population, labor, education 
and health. It contains data at an individual level for the dwellings interviewed. Since 2004, 
PNAD has investigated data for all national territory
4. With the purpose of analyzing the past 
and current trends of employment, we used data from four different decades: 1978, 1988, 
1998, and 2007, the most recent data released by IBGE. Questionnaires were modified during 
this period; however, we made some concatenations in order to make them comparable.   
  One  common  way  to  measure  distribution  of  workers  among  occupations  is  the 
Duncan index. It measures the dissimilarity of distribution of the groups among professions 
using the half distance of the absolute sum of percentage participation of men and women at 
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where  Fj stands for the percentage of females working at occupation j and  
Mj stands for the percentage of males working at occupation j.  
                                                 
3 Up to a ceiling of 12 thousand reais, maternity leave is paid by the employer who is reimbursed by the 
government in taxes. This is a very high ceiling. Less than 3 percent of female workers earn more than this value 
monthly. 
4 Until then, 1.9 percent of the Brazilian population was not included in the sample because they lived in areas 
not researched. However, the analysis contains weights that allow the comparison to be maintained from 
previous years.   One way to read the Duncan index is the percentage of females that have to change 
their  occupations  in  order  to  have  a  perfect  distribution  by  gender  in  each  occupation. 
Therefore, if the Duncan index is close to zero, we conclude that there is low segregation by 
gender. However, the higher the Duncan index – and 1 is its maximum value – the larger the 
separation. The Duncan index for Brazilian occupations was 0.493 in1978 and fell to 0.383 in 
2007
5. This means that the different proportion of men and women among occupations is 
being destroyed. The gradual change in these numbers is to be expected, as a certain amount 
of time is necessary for the gender profile to be modified for each occupation.  
  Table 1 shows this information with more specific data
6. This table presents female 
distribution among different occupation categories. For each year, we divided the occupations 
into  traditionally  male  or  traditionally  female.  It  can  be  observed  that  the  majority  of 
occupations maintain the trend of being male vacancies (for instance, carpenters, mechanics, 
drivers, etc.), while others maintain the tendency of being female occupations (in this case, 
nurses, librarians, schoolteachers are the better examples). However, some changes became 
visible. While in 1978 only 4.94 percent of engineers were women, in 2007 more than 10 
percent of engineers were female. It is still a small number of individuals; however, it sets a 
change  of  pattern.  Other  examples  of  traditionally  male  occupations  that  are  being  more 
occupied  by  women  are  insurance  agents,  police  and  detectives,  and  managers  and 
administrators.  
On the other side, traditionally female occupations rarely present this change. Two 
possibilities explain this. The first is that men  resist engaging in ‘female’ activities. This 
would  reflect  gender  preferences  for  certain  activities  and  dislike  for  others.  The  other 
alternative is that society resists having men in these occupations. For example, male nurses 
may be less required than female nurses. A man who chooses to become a nurse may be 
viewed  as  a  ‘failed  doctor’  more  easily  than  would  a  woman
7.  This  second  option  is 
commonly known as consumer prejudice (Patterson & Engelberg, 1978). 
  These  differentials  on  occupations  and  industry  choices  may  be  one  of  the 
determinants of remuneration discrepancy between genders.  In order to better control this 
                                                 
5 For the purpose of comparison, the United States had a 0.414 Duncan index in 2005 (Chakravarty & Silber, 
2007). 
6 This table was inspired by Table 8.3, in Kaufman and Hotchkiss (2003, p.425). 
7 Anecdotal evidence of this is the Hollywood hit movie ‘Meet the Parents’, where the parents of the fiancée 
avoid saying that their future son-in-law is a nurse.  effect,  Table  2  provides  the  individuals’  hourly  payment  for  economic  occupation  with 
gender
8 for 1978 and 2007. Table 3 does the same for economic sector and gender. 
Using the same categories analyzed in Table 1, it can be seen for most that men have 
bigger salaries than women. In 1978, for only two occupations, drivers and librarians, did 
females have a higher average salary than males. For another 16 occupations, men received 
higher  remuneration  than  women.  In  2007,  there  is  a  slightly  different  view:  in  12 
occupations, men have bigger wages than women and, for three others women earn better 
wages than men (auto mechanics, drivers, and police and detectives). With no controls for 
education and industry – which are looked at next - it appears that a long time passed with too 
few changes happening with regard to gender remuneration differences. 
Concerning  the  industry  sector,  Table  3  shows  that,  usually,  men  used  to  receive 
higher wages than women. However, in one activity we have a positive and significant impact 
on  female  salaries:  construction.  This  is  also  one  of  the  activities  with  lower  female 
engagement.  One  possible  explanation  for  this  premium  on  female  wages  is  individual 
selection. In order to participate in this industry, women have to be so different from the 
average that they receive higher wages than men. Analyzing the education distribution among 
industries, it can be seen that in the construction industry women have a higher education than 
men. In 1978, almost 60 percent of females in the construction industry had 9 or more years 
of education (completed primary level of education), while less than 8 percent of males in this 
industry had this level of education. In 2007, 68 percent of women in this industry had more 
than 9 years of education, while 21 percent of men were in the same condition. 
  This question raises the importance of analyzing the degree of education. Comparing 
1978 and 2007 data, we can see some different trends for genders in Table 4. In 1978, men 
with a low level of education were concentrated in the agribusiness sector, with women with 
no education being in the same sector, but those who had a small amount of education – 1 to 4 
– had migrated to services. When men had from 5 to 11 years of education, they left the 
agribusiness and moved to transformation industry, while women were basically in services 
and the social sector. For both genders having more than 11 years of education, there is a 
higher concentration in the social sector. The picture in 2007 is a little different. Men with a 
low  education  continue  to  concentrate  on  agribusiness  (until  4  years  of  education),  and 
women on services. However, after finishing the basic level of education, i.e. 4 years, men 
were employed in commerce. Women, for their part, continue to be concentrated in services 
                                                 
8 Here we do not control for hours of work or qualification (education degree, for example). These additional 
controls and others will be the focus of the next sections, with the regression model. until completing the fundamental level of education, i.e. 8 years, and after that they compose 
a larger fraction of commerce. 
 
3. Econometric model to calculate discrimination between genders 
  The  previous  analysis  illustrates  that  male  and  female  workers  have  different 
allocations and returns on the labor market in Brazil. There follows an econometric analysis 
in order to control distinct influences on individual remuneration. Using this procedure, we 
will also be able to measure the impact of occupational choices and individual characteristics 
on the hourly wage.  
  The basic model follows Mincer (1995). The mincerian equation relates the hourly 







j i Z X w ε γ β α + + + = ∑ ∑
= = 1 1
ln             (1) 
where wi is the hourly wage for individual i, Xi are the demographics for individual i. Zi 
represents dummy variables for activities and occupations for each individual
9.  
  By demographics we mean individual age and its squared value – to account for the 
concavity on remuneration – residence region
10 and education dummies
11. Zi is composed 
both by occupation and by industry dummies. For all years, we used the classification of them 
on three-digit dummies. 
Also, we were able to test the influence of occupational distinction of authority on 
wages. Budig and England (2001) created a dummy variable for authority. This variable was 
composed using code 1 for all occupations that have the words ‘management’, ‘supervisor’ or 
‘foreman’ in their description. As dependent variable they used the natural log of hourly wage 
in the respondent’s current job in this study about the wage penalty of motherhood. They find 
that mothers are less likely to be in jobs involving authority; however, it does not seem to 
have an effect on the estimated motherhood penalty. In our work ‘authority’ was included as a 
variable of job characteristic. This variable is a dummy coded 1 for occupational categories 
with titles containing the words ‘supervisor’, ‘manager’ or ‘director’. We used this additional 
variable only for the 2007 data which is more complete. Also, for 2007, we included race 
dummies
12 and tenure on the job
13 in order to have a more complete set of controls
14. 
                                                 
9 Excluded category is Agricultural Business. 
10 Excluded category is Southeast, the richest Brazilian region. 
11 Excluded category ‘No education’. Other categories are: basic (1 to 4 years), fundamental (5 to 8 years), high 
school (9 to 11 years) and college or more (12 or more years). 
12 Excluded category is White; other categories are Black, Mulato, Asiatic and Native. Since the main purpose of this study is to analyze female labor characteristics, we 
estimated equation (1) separately for men and women using ordinary least squares. We did 
not use a Heckman correction for the female equation because we are concerned only with 
working individuals. These regressions result in two different outcomes posed as equations 
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i Z X w ε γ β α + + + = ∑ ∑
= = 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ln           (3) 
where equation (2) uses only female data to estimate the coefficients, and equation (3) uses 
the male data to this end. These features allow us use the Oaxaca (1973) method to estimate 
the male–female differences not explained by their own characteristics. Using the estimated 
coefficients for female and male individuals, we calculate the hourly wage one individual 
would have if he or she was a male and, the alternative possibility, if he or she was a female. 
We  use  these  computations  to  determine  the  wage  differential  that  is  not  explained  by 







j i X X D ∑ ∑ − = β β ˆ ˆ ˆ             (4) 
  We  compare  the  estimated  value  of  equation  (4)  for  each  individual  and  use  the 
population average for this variable as the estimation of the non-explained portion of gender 
gap across the years. The bigger the value of the difference for the sample, the bigger the 
gender discrimination in the sample
15. In the next section, we present the results. 
 
4. And the difference between genders is… 
  We estimate equations (2) and (3) for the different samples: 1978, 1988, 1998 and 
2007  separately.  As  mentioned  earlier,  for  2007,  because  of  the  availability  of  additional 
                                                                                                                                                          
13 Excluded category is ‘less than 6 months’; other categories are ‘6 months to 1 year’, ‘1 to 2 years’, ‘2 to 5 
years’ and ‘more then 5 years’. 
14 Since 1976, IBGE changed the PNAD questionnaires many times. We do not have all the basic variables for 
all years. Therefore, we estimate a more complete equation only for 2007, but kept the ‘basic’ regression for all 
years in order to be able to compare results. 
15 D statistic can either be an overestimation or underestimation of discrimination. Not all the differences verified 
on variable D can be considered discrimination per se. As the  microdata available are not complete for the 
individual characteristics, we only can affirm that we control for ‘observable’ characteristics of each individual 
and the D statistic represents the effect of ‘non-observable’ characteristics neither to the researcher nor the labor 
contractors. Therefore, remaining differences would be some sort of discrimination by gender. On the other 
hand, D may underestimate the discrimination because we control for occupation, for example, and, if there is 
non-market discrimination that induces women to opt for easier and worse remunerated occupations, we would 
not see it on the final estimation. See Oaxaca, 1973. variables, we included extra controls of race, tenure and authority. Our baseline regression 
includes demographics and industry sector. The final model also includes occupational codes 
with three digits
16. 
Tables 5 to 8 show the estimated results separated by gender. Columns (1) and (3) 
refer to male results, and columns (2) and (4) refer to female results. For all years, we find a 
positive effect of age, with a concavity expressed by the variable age squared. These effects 
are expected, because they reflect the experience or the greater familiarity of the worker with 
the labor market. The concavity is verified because the incremental value of experience along 
the  years  has  decreasing  returns  to  the  production  and,  consequently,  to  the  individual 
remuneration. Some studies use the age variable as a proxy for experience. However, this is 
not a good approach to infer women’s labor experience, because they experience time out of 
the labor market to have and raise children. Therefore, variable age measures more the impact 
during  the  lifetime  than  the  labor  experience.  In  order  to  have  some  control  on  labor 
experience, results for 2007 also includes the variable ‘tenure on the job’, that captures part of 
this effect. 
The second variable category is the regional dummies. Except for 2007, Southeast, the 
excluded category, has a bigger positive impact on wages for men and women. In 2007 it is 
possible to verify ‘Center’ as the region that better pays men and women in all regressions. 
This may be an effect of migration to the Southeast that began to occur in the 1960s and 
stabilized at the end of the 1990s as growth registered in the Central region, which was poorly 
occupied until the end of the 1980s
17.   
Education dummies are the third control variables. For both men and women, wage 
increases with higher education degree. The impact of education is consistently greater for 
males than females throughout the categories and years
18.  
Finally, there is the occupation and industry impact on wages. Because occupation is 
divided into many groups, its analysis is too intricate. However, industry indicators are fewer, 
and we can see a tendency on the estimated coefficients. For males, the industrial sector pays 
more. For females, public administration confers more wage benefits than other occupations. 
These effects may be a combination of discrimination with gender comparative advantage. 
                                                 
16 We have a different number of categories for each year, being more specific in recent years. However, for all 
samples we used the most detailed variable available. 
17 During the 1950s the National Capital City moved from Rio de Janeiro (Southeast) to Brasilia (Center). 
However, the population boom for the region continued until the 1980s, not only to the new capital but also for 
other states such as Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul, where the agribusiness and wood collectors were 
installed.  
18 The same result was found using quantile estimation in Santos and Ribeiro (2006).  Bergmann (1974) sets a model to test the profitability function of occupation discrimination 
against  the  sociological  purpose  of  it.  She  concludes  that  the  latter  may  have  a  bigger 
influence on decision-takers. Using her model, we can conclude that activities with more 
social impact appear to suit women more and those where technical appeal is stronger, suit 
men better. Therefore, recruiters prefer to attribute each individual to the economic sector that 
best suits his/her gender rules (Hochschild, 2003). 
For 2007 data, we also made an additional model that includes race, manager indicator 
and tenure on the job. Results are on columns (5) and (6) of table 8. The variables analyzed 
earlier maintain their impact and significance. The included variables have significance for 
both  men  and  women.  The  race  impact  demonstrates  that  Asiatic  individuals  earn  bigger 
wages  than  other  races.  Tenure  on  the  job  is  another  variable  that  consistently  increases 
wages. However, in this case, the impact on female wages is bigger than on male wages. 
Staying for more than 5 years in the same job has a positive impact on male and female 
wages; however, the impact on women’s wages is 5 percent bigger
19. This result is very 
interesting, because it may mean the need of women to use their labor participation constancy 
to signal that they wish to continue in their jobs. Intermittency is one special characteristic of 
the  labor  market  for  women.  For  many  years,  women  used  to  work  only  before  getting 
married or, in some cases, until having the first child. However, nowadays both maternity 
leave  benefits  and  the  degree  of  effort  women  put  into  their  education  make  possible 
remaining  in  the  labor  market  after  having  a  family.  Even  so,  employers  may  doubt  this 
intention and reward with higher wages only women that communicate better their intentions. 
This effect appears to be the same that Spence posed for education (Spence, 1973).    
Finally, the ‘manager effect’ has no significant impact for either men or women. Our 
result is similar to Budig and England (2001), who did not find a significant effect of the 
variable authority on wages.  
  These  results  point  to  better  conditions  for  females  in  the  Brazilian  labor  market; 
however, by no means are they conclusive. One way to discover better answers is to use the 
Oaxaca  decomposition,  as  shown  in  equation  (4).  Using  the  female  characteristics  and 
inputting them both on male and on female estimated coefficients, we can compare a woman 
being paid ‘like a man’ and ‘like a woman’. If the individual maintains all her characteristics 
but is paid differently, we can say there is room to call it discrimination. Table 10 shows these 
results for the four analyzed years. 
                                                 
19 This difference is statistically significant at 5%.    For each year, we used the estimated coefficients in equations (2) and (3) to estimate 
the  predicted  hourly  wage  for  the  women’s  sample.  Table  10  reports  the  results  without 
logarithmics, i.e. each value represents the predicted wage for women considering their own 
characteristics  inputted  both  on  men’s  estimated  coefficients  and  women’s  estimated 
coefficients.  We  report  the  difference  in  market  remuneration  for  men  and  women  by  a 
percentage. Rows with ‘difference’ represent how many percent women earn less than men. 
All the predicted values were tested and were significantly different. We observe that men 
used  to  earn  bigger  wages  than  women  and  continue  to  do  so  nowadays.  However,  this 
difference was 33 percent and, in 2007, is slightly higher than 16 percent. For 2007, we have 
two estimations: one with the equation that retains the controls available for other years (as in 
Tables 5 to 8), and the other with the additional controls of race, tenure and authority (Table 
9). We note that with better controls, this difference is reduced. 
  A final comment concerning these results is that we conclude that the difference in 
pay in Brazil is decreasing when comparing both genders. However, some aspects are not 
dealt with in this methodology. As we use a control for occupations and all the preceding 
discussions show that there is some evidence of gender segregation in some occupations, we 
might be underestimating this difference.  
 
5. Conclusion  
  As in other countries, labor market conditions for women in Brazil also are presenting 
improvements. Labor regulation provides both the positive effect of guaranteeing the presence 
of an adult in households with children, mainly by paid maternity leave, and the negative 
effect of increasing informal hiring. In addition to regulation, discrimination and different 
preferences in hiring explain part of the wage gender gap. 
  The  present  analysis  of  the  Brazilian  labor  market  shows  that  there  is  gender 
segregation in occupations and industries; however, it does not have a negative impact for all 
categories. For those where women receive higher remuneration than men, we observe their 
higher education, meaning women are being remunerated better by their characteristics. This 
result  is  compatible  with  that  of  Madalozzo  and  Martins  (2007)  which  used  quantile 
regression to investigate the wage gap by conditional distribution.  
Estimation  results  show  different  returns  for  all  variables  depending  on  gender. 
Usually, women are more poorly remunerated by their characteristics than men. The Oaxaca 
decomposition reinforces this conclusion showing that, for the same characteristics, men are 
better paid than women. This difference is falling, but is still a significant 15.4 percent, on average,  in  2007.  Compared  with  Giuberti  and  Menezes-Filho  (2005),  the  present  study 
improves the quantification of this wage gap, showing that the trend of a decreasing gap 
remains, but is losing pace overtime. 
Since  women’s  participation  in  the  labor  market  is  an  endogenous  decision  with 
remuneration of their work, this persistent difference when compared to men is a potential 
disincentive to better education and constancy in the market. Both conditions are dangerous to 
the  economy:  education  by  perpetuating  the  Brazilian  income  inequality  (Bourguignon, 
Ferreira, & Menéndez, 2007); and constancy by appealing to women to leave the labor market 
more often because of the opportunity  costs of  maintaining ‘two shifts’. Researchers and 
policy-makers should pay attention to these impacts and provide viable alternatives to ensure 
women’s entrance into the labor market. 
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Figure 1: Labor Market Participation. Male and Female, 1950–2007. 
 
Source: IBGE, Estatísticas do Século XX. 
 Table  1:  Percentage  of  females  in  traditionally  male  and  traditionally  female 
occupations. 
Traditionally Male Occupations  Traditionally Female Occupations 
Percent Female  Percent Female 
Occupation  1978  1988  1998  2007  Occupation  1978  1988  1998  2007 
Engineers  4.94  2.47  8.35  10.08  Registered 
nurses  86.94  89.92  86.83  86.48 
Lawyers  18.18  25.86  38.40  43.86  Librarians  89.56  82.10  92.55  79.41 
Physicians  18.29  22.07  48.15  42.87  Schoolteachers  90.58  88.87  91.41  81.54 
Economists  18.76  16.84  32.44  76.13  Bank tellers  54.70  72.43  51.94  55.51 
Clergy  20.54  14.25  27.79  24.96  Secretaries  52.23  98.26  61.48  62.39 
Insurance 
agents  10.46  0.00  28.69  32.69  Typists  37.04  26.25  91.82  13.40 
Managers and 




95.17  97.00  93.54  91.99 
Carpenters  1.05  0.28  2.20  2.04  Dental 
assistants  22.53  22.87  53.49  55.27 
Auto 
mechanics  0.29  1.19  0.47  1.36  Child-care 
workers  -  100.00  97.86  97.76 
Telephone 
line installers  0.76  0.00  6.28  3.05           
Drivers  0.17  0.40  1.20  1.59           
Police and 
Detectives  2.28  11.86  11.71  12.23           
 Table 2: Hourly wage by gender and occupations: 1978 and 2007. 
Hourly Wage 
  1978  2007 
Occupation  Men  Women  Men  Women 
Engineers  178.55  158.88*  31.00  22.45 
Lawyers  206.96  135.82*  22.84  19.32* 
Physicians  263.65  125.52*  51.23  35.15* 
Economists  246.08  130.70*  23.29  14.74* 
Clergy  34.85  14.40*  7.22  3.99* 
Insurance agents  69.06  80.63  13.51  11.89 
Managers and 
administrators  99.08  70.11*  17.97  15.34* 
Carpenters  21.69  8.56*  4.36  2.26* 
Auto mechanics  24.04  10.70*  4.95  8.30* 
Telephone line 
installers  34.54  19.79*  5.36  4.64* 
Drivers  27.13  38.04*  6.36  8.42* 
Police and Detectives  52.64  43.43*  12.47  15.44* 
Registered nurses  31.38  22.76  12.40  12.76 
Librarians  26.60  51.22*  91.61  11.86 
Schoolteachers  55.65  33.31*  9.87  8.75* 
Bank tellers  51.43  22.36*  12.48  9.02* 
Secretaries  32.70  29.56*  7.43  5.93* 
Typists  28.00  22.12*  8.01  2.81* 
Sewing machine 
operators  30.26  12.57*  3.29  3.25 
Dental assistants  192.14  133.04*  23.58  21.64 
Childcare workers  -  -  6.79  7.00 
Note: Asterisks (*) means the female and male values are different at 95%¨of confidence. Table 3: Hourly wage by gender and industries: 1978 and 2007. 
Hourly Wage 
  1978  2007 
Activity  Men  Women  Men  Women 
Agricultural  14.86  6.49*  3.10  0.91* 
Transformation 
Industry 
38.11  17.42*  7.12  4.33* 
Construction  23.21  38.82*  4.72  19.72* 
General Industry  31.46  33.10  10.45  11.02 
Comerce  38.26  21.81*  6.48  4.83* 
Services  40.00  12.30*  7.65  3.56* 
Transportation  32.67  26.39*  7.28  7.45 
Social Services  74.35  32.77*  13.45  8.26* 
Public Administration  50.08  45.15*  12.02  10.99* 
Other Activities  78.14  38.85*  9.12  7.04* 
 Table 4: Percentage of male and female by education and industry: 1978 and 2007. 
Panel A: 1978 
  No education  1 to 4 years  5 to 8 years  9 to 11 years  More than 
11 years 
Male Workers 
Agribusiness  62.82%  30.92%  9.28%  3.39%  1.39% 
Transformation   8.67%  19.73%  24.87%  24.65%  19.92% 
Construction  11.40%  14.71%  9.71%  4.78%  5.54% 
Other industrial 
activities  1.86%  2.38%  2.13%  3.22%  3.13% 
Commerce  5.45%  9.75%  15.55%  17.10%  7.66% 




2.68%  6.87%  9.47%  6.17%  3.34% 
Social  0.74%  1.77%  3.50%  5.63%  21.03% 
Public 
Administration  1.10%  2.99%  7.87%  10.39%  13.23% 
Other activities  0.59%  1.07%  3.03%  11.11%  9.71% 
Female Workers 
Agribusiness  49.00%  23.37%  5.55%  0.37%  0.06% 
Transformation   6.71%  14.00%  17.68%  11.16%  6.89% 
Construction  0.10%  0.24%  0.47%  1.29%  1.55% 
Other industrial 
activities  0.32%  0.28%  0.31%  1.05%  1.56% 
Commerce  3.72%  7.82%  17.25%  12.85%  4.08% 




0.20%  0.72%  1.90%  2.78%  2.03% 
Social  2.65%  8.95%  20.00%  43.35%  57.74% 
Public 
Administration  0.39%  1.06%  3.33%  7.35%  10.46% 
Other activities  1.04%  1.29%  2.43%  7.55%  7.94% 
 Panel B: 2007 
  No education  1 to 4 years  5 to 8 years  9 to 11 years  More than 
11 years 
Male Workers 
Agribusiness  53.37%  35.28%  15.30%  5.78%  1.82% 
Transformation   7.95%  12.11%  18.36%  21.93%  13.70% 
Construction  14.54%  18.55%  16.50%  7.07%  3.43% 
Other industrial 
activities  0.84%  0.93%  1.13%  1.83%  1.66% 
Commerce  9.84%  13.20%  21.04%  24.69%  16.05% 




3.75%  6.87%  9.91%  9.07%  5.20% 
Social  0.67%  1.01%  1.40%  3.53%  16.42% 
Public 
Administration  2.03%  2.67%  3.12%  7.89%  13.38% 
Other activities  4.15%  6.09%  9.51%  14.25%  23.47% 
Female Workers 
Agribusiness  44.39%  31.19%  11.32%  2.93%  0.59% 
Transformation   8.12%  11.74%  16.08%  14.21%  6.87% 
Construction  0.29%  0.36%  0.35%  0.55%  0.95% 
Other industrial 
activities  0.11%  0.07%  0.11%  0.26%  0.68% 
Commerce  8.32%  9.43%  15.36%  25.48%  11.86% 




0.31%  0.42%  0.85%  2.43%  2.55% 
Social  3.51%  5.16%  6.59%  17.70%  44.52% 
Public 
Administration  1.25%  1.46%  2.10%  5.21%  10.67% 
Other activities  5.71%  6.90%  10.57%  12.98%  16.53% 
 Table 5: Estimation Results, 1978. 
















































































































































































Occupations  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.4890  0.5251  0.5817  0.5957 
Number of 
Observations  103,142  44,493  103,142  644,493 
Note: Between parenthesis are the t-statistic for each coefficient. Table 6: Estimation Results, 1988. 
















































































































































































Occupations  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.3135  0.3473  0.3774  0.4052 
Number of 
Observations  8,111  3,466  8,111  3,466 
Note: Between parenthesis are the t-statistic for each coefficient. 
 Table 7: Estimation Results, 1998. 
















































































































































































Occupations  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.4870  0.4792  0.5677  0.5593 
Number of 
Observations  70,440  43,320  70,440  43,320 
Note: Between parenthesis are the t-statistic for each coefficient. 
 Table 8: Estimation Results, 2007. 













































































































































































































































































































Occupations  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.4133  0.3971  0.4891  0.4879  0.4971  0.4970 
Number of 
Observations  89,119  61,971  89,119  61,971  89,114  61,970 
Note: Between parenthesis are the t-statistic for each coefficient. 
 Table 9: Oaxaca Results. 
  Estimated Average Hourly Wage 
1978   
As men  14.51 
As women  9.71 
Difference  −33.05% 
1988   
As men  261.57 
As women  201.35 
Difference  −23.02% 
1998   
As men  1.90 
As women  1.55 
Difference  −18.42% 
2007   
As men  3.97 
As women  3.22 
Difference  −16.19% 
2007 with more controls   
As men  3.96 
As women  3.35 
Difference  −15.40% 
 
 